Willème was founded in 1923 by Louis Willeme, after working for Automobiles Grégoire.
Most were made with Deutz AG engines; some with in-house engines; some with AEC. In the 1960s, Willème also sold rebadged AEC and BMC trucks.
Willème went bankrupt in 1970 and were taken over by PRP (Perez et Raymond), who continued to produce Willème’s TG range of trucks. Eventually, some MOL Trucks were based on Willème designs.
Some Willème heavy-haul trucks are still in service.
This is everything I could find about WILLÈME, a fascinational and remarkable French Truck on the World Wide Web. Enjoy the pictures with me, and when you have pictures or info that can make this blog more interesting I will appreciate this. Thanks and enjoy.
Delahayeautomobile was an automotive manufacturing company founded by Emile Delahaye in 1894, in Tours, France, his home town. His first cars were belt-driven, with single- or twin-cylinder engines mounted at the rear. His Type One was an instant success, and he urgently needed investment capital and a larger manufacturing facility. Both were provided by a new Delahaye owner and fellow racer, George Morane, and his brother-in-law Leon Desmarais, who partnered with Emile in the incorporation of the new automotive company, “Societe Des Automobiles Delahaye”, in 1898. All three worked with the foundry workers to assemble the new machines, but middle-aged Emile was not in good health. In January 1901, he found himself unable to capably continue, and resigned, selling his shares to his two equal partners. Emile Delahaye died soon after, in 1905. Delahaye had hired two instrumental men, Charles Weiffenbach and Amadee Varlet in 1898, to assist the three partners. Both were graduate mechanical engineers, and they remained with Delahaye their entire working careers. Weiffenbach was appointed Manager of Operations, and, with the blessing of both George Morane and Leon Desmarais, assumed control over all of Delahaye’s operations and much of its decision-making, in 1906. Amadee Varlet was the company’s design-engineer, with a number of innovative inventions to his credit, generated between 1905 and 1914, which Delahaye patented. These included the twin-cam multi-valve engine, and the V6 configuration. Varlet continued in this role until he eventually took over the Drawing Office, at 76 years of age, when much younger Jean Francois was hired in 1932 as chief design-engineer. In 1932, Varlet was instructed by Weiffenbach, under direction from majority shareholder Madam Desmarais, Leon Desmarais’ widow, to set up the company’s Racing Department, assisted by Jean Francois. <Club Delahaye archive>. Those who knew him well at the factory affectionately referred to Charles Weiffenbach as “Monsieur Charles”.
Delahaye began experimenting with belt-driven cars while manager of the Brethon Foundry and Machine-works in Tours, in 1894. These experiments encouraged an entry in the 1896 Paris–Marseille–Paris race, held between 24 September-3 October 1896, fielding one car for himself and one for sportsman Ernest Archdeacon. The winning Panhard averaged 15.7 mph (25.3 km/h); Archdeacon came sixth, averaging 14 mph (23 km/h), while Delahaye himself was eighth, averaging 12.5 mph (20.1 km/h).
For the 1897 Paris-Dieppe, the 6 hp (4.5 kW; 6.1 PS) four-cylinder Delahayes ran in four- and six-seater classes, with a full complement of passengers. Archdeacon was third in the four-seaters behind a De Dion-Bouton and a Panhard, Courtois winning the six-seater class, ahead of the only other car in the class.
In March 1898, 6 hp (4.5 kW; 6.1 PS) the Delahayes of Georges Morane and Courtois came sixteenth and twenty-eighth at the Marseilles-Nice rally, while at the Course de Perigeux in May, De Solages finished sixth in a field of ten. The July Paris-Amsterdam-Paris earned a satisfying class win for Giver in his Delahaye; the overall win went to Panhard.
Soon after the new company was formed in 1898, the firm moved its manufacturing from Tours to Paris, into its new factory (a former hydraulic machinery plant that Morane and his brother-in-law Leon Desmarais had inherited from Morane’s father). Charles Weiffenbach was named Operations Manager. Delahaye would produce three models there, until the close of the 19th century: two twins, the 2.2-litre 4.5 hp (3.4 kW; 4.6 PS) Type 1 and 6 hp (4.5 kW; 6.1 PS) Type 2, and the lighter Type 0 (which proved capable of up to 22 mph (35 km/h)), with a 1.4-liter single rated between 5 and 7 hp (3.7 and 5.2 kW; 5.1 and 7.1 PS). All three had bicycle-style steering, water-cooled engines mounted in the rear, automatic valves, surface carburetors, and trembler coilignition; drive was a combination of belt and chain, with three forward speeds and one reverse.
In 1899, Archdeacon piloted an 8 hp (6.0 kW; 8.1 PS) racer in the Nice-Castellane-Nice rally, coming eighth, while teammate Buissot’s 8 hp (6.0 kW; 8.1 PS) was twelfth.
Founder Emile Delahaye retired in 1901, leaving Desmarais and Morane in control; Weiffenbach took over from them in 1906. Delahaye’s racing days were over with Emile Delahaye’s death. Charles Weiffenbach had no interest in racing, and focused his production on responsible motorized automotive chassis, heavy commercial vehicles, and early firetrucks for the French government. Race-cars had become a thing of the past for Delahaye, until 1933, when Madam Desmarais caused her company to change direction a hundred-and-eighty degree, and return to racing.
The new 10B debuted in 1902. It had a 2,199 cc (134.2 cu in) (100 by 140 mm (3.9 by 5.5 in)) vertical twin rated 12/14 hp by RAC, mounted in front, with removable cylinder head, steering wheel (rather than bicycle handles or tiller), and chain drive. Delahaye also entered the Paris-Vienna rally with a 16 hp (12 kW; 16 PS) four; Pirmez was thirty-seventh in the voiturette class. At the same year’s Ardennes event, Perrin’s 16 hp (12 kW; 16 PS) four came tenth.
Also in 1902, the singles and twins ceased to be offered except as light vans; before production ceased in 1904, about 850 had been built.
Delahaye’s first production four, the Type 13B, with 24/27 hp 4.4-litre, appeared in 1903. The model range expanded in 1904, including the 4.9-litre 28 hp (21 kW; 28 PS) four-cylinder Type 21, the mid-priced Type 16, and the two-cylinder Type 15B. These were joined in 1905 by a chain-driven 8-litre luxury model, one of which was purchased by King Alfonso.
All 1907 models featured half-elliptic springs at the rear as well as transverse leaf springs, and while shaft drive appeared that year, chain drive was retained on luxury models until 1911. In 1908, the Type 32 was the company’s first to offer an L-head monoblock engine.
Protos began licence production of Delahayes in Germany in 1907, while in 1909, h. M. Hobson began importing Delahayes to Britain. Also in 1909, White pirated the Delahaye design; the First World War interrupted any efforts to recover damages.
Delahaye invented and pioneered the V6 engine in 1911, with a 30° 3.2-litre twin-cam, in the Type 44; the invention is credited to Amadee Varlet, Delahaye’s chief design-engineer at the time. The Type 44 was not a success and production stopped in 1914. It had been designed by Amadee Varlet, who had joined Delahaye at the same time that Charles Weiffenback was hired by Emile Delahaye, in 1898. The Type 44 was the only V-6 engine ever made by Delahaye, and it was the last time the company used a twin-cam engine.
Delahaye engineer Amadee Varlet designed the Delahaye “Titan” marine engine, an enormous cast-iron four cylinder engine that was fitted into purpose-built speedboat “La Dubonnet” which briefly held the World Speed Record on Water. With the ‘Titan’ Amadee Varlet had invented the multi-valve twin-cam engine in 1905, the same year that Emile Delahaye died.
At the Paris factory, Delahaye continued to manufacture cars, trucks, and a few buses. By the end of World War I, their major income was from their truck business that included France’s firetrucks.
After the war, Delahaye switched to a modest form of assembly line production, following the example of Ford, hampered by the “extensive and not particularly standardized range” of cars for Chenard et Walker, and itself, and farm machines for the FAR Tractor Company. The collaboration with FAR Tractor Company and Chenard-Walcker did not last long. This continued until continually reduced sales volume made a change necessary, for the company to survive. It has been alleged that Monsieur Charles met with his friend, competitor Ettore Bugatti, to seek his opinion on turning Delahaye around. Whether or not this meeting actually occurred, it is on record that Madam Leon Desmarais, the majority shareholder and Leon Desmarais’ widow, instructed Charles Weiffenbach to come up with a new higher quality automotive-chassis line with vastly improved horsepower, and re-establish a racing department. That pivotal decision was made in 1932, the year that Jean Francois was hired. By 1933, Delahaye was back in the racing game, and promptly went about winning events and setting records.
At the 1933 Paris Salon, Delahaye showed the Superluxe, with a 3.2-litre six, transverse independent front suspension, and Cotalpreselector or synchromesh-equipped manual transmission. It would be accompanied in the model range by a 2,150 cc (131 cu in) four (essentially a cut-down six), and a sporting variant, the 18 Sport.
In 1934, Delahaye set eighteen class records at Montlhéry, in a specially-prepared, stripped and streamlined 18 Sport. They also introduced the 134N, a 12cv car with a 2.15-litre four-cylinder engine, and the 18cv Type 138, powered by a 3.2-litre six — both engines derived from their successful truck engines. In 1935, success in the Alpine Trial led to the introduction of the sporting Type 135 “Coupe des Alpes”. By the end of 1935, Delahaye had won eighteen minor French sports car events and a number of hill-climbs, and came fifth at Le Mans.
Racing success brought success to their car business as well, enough for Delahaye to buy Delage in 1935. Delage cars continued in production from 1935 to 1951, and were finally superseded by the Type 235, a modestly updated 135. The truck business continued to thrive. Some of the great coachbuilders who provided bodies for Delahayes include Figoni et Falaschi, Chapron, and Letourneur et Marchand, and Joseph Saoutchik, as well as Guillore, Faget-Varlet, Pourtout, and a few others less well known.
Delahaye ran four 160 hp (120 kW; 160 PS) cars (based on the Type 135) in the 1936 Ulster TT, placing second to Bugatti, and entered four at the Belgian 24 Hours, coming 2-3-4-5 behind an Alfa Romeo.
American heiress Lucy O’Reilly Schell approached the company with an offer to pay the development costs to build short “Competition Court” 2.70- metre wheelbase Type 135 cars to her specifications for rallying. Sixteen were produced, most having been uniformly bodied by “Lacanu” a small coachbuilding firm owned and operated by Olivier Lecanu-Deschamps. Joseph Figoni also bodied one of these chassis. Lecanu could respond quickly, build economically, and was favored by Delahaye for its race-cars. All four Type 145 race-cars were bodied by Lecanu, to a weirdly homely design by Jean Francois. Lecanu both designed and built the last of the four Type 145 bodies, this one on chassis 48775.
In 1937, René Le Bègue and Julio Quinlin won the Monte Carlo Rally driving a Delahaye. Delahaye also ran first and second at Le Mans. Against the government-sponsored juggernauts Mercedes-Benz and Auto Union, Delahaye brought out the Type 145, powered by a new, complicated 4½-liter V12 with three camshafts located in the block, with pushrod-actuated valves and four overhead rocker-shafts, dual Bosch magneto ignition, and triple Stromberg carburettors. Called “Million Franc Delahaye” after a victory in the Million Franc Race, the initial Type 145, chassis 48771, was driven by René Dreyfus to an average speed 91.07 mph (146.56 km/h) over 200 kilometres (120 mi) at Montlhéry in 1937, earning a Fr200,000 prize from the government. Dreyfus also scored a victory in the Ecurie Bleu Type 145, again number 48771 at Pau, relying on superior fuel economy to beat the more powerful Mercedes-Benz W154, in 1938. Third place in the same race was claimed by Gianfranco Comotti, driving Delahaye Type 145 number 48775. Dreyfus brought his Type 145 number 48771 to its second grand-prix win at Cork, in Ireland, but the German teams had boycotted this event, being another between-the-houses race where they could not exploit their superior power. Type 135s also won the Paris-Nice and Monte Carlo Rallys, and LeMans, that year, while a V12 model (Type 145 number 48773) was fourth in the Mille Miglia. These victories combined with French patriotism to create a wave of demand for Delahaye cars, up until the German occupation of France during World War II. The Type 145 was also the basis for five grand-touring Type 165s, three of which exist today. The other two were demolished during the second World War.
In early 1940, one hundred Type 134N and Type 168 chassis were built (Renault-bodied) as military cars under contract for the French army. The government had ordered private sales to cease in June, 1939, but small numbers of cars continued to be built for the occupying German forces until at least 1942.
After the Second World War
After World War II, the depressed French economy and an increasingly punitive luxury tax regime aimed at luxurious non-essential products, and cars with engines above 2-litres, made life difficult for luxury auto-makers. Like all the principal French automakers, Delahaye complied with government requirements in allocating the majority of its vehicles for export, and in 1947 88% of Delahaye production was exported (compared to 87% of Peugeot and 80% of Talbot output), primarily to French colonies, including those in Africa. Nevertheless, Delahaye volumes, with 573 cars produced in 1948 (against 34,164 by market-leader Citroën), were unsustainably low.
Production of the Type 135 was resumed, with new styling by Philippe Charbonneaux. The Type 175, with a 4.5-litre inline overhead-valve six, was introduced in 1948; this, and the related Type 178 and 180, proved unsuccessful. The Type 175, 178 and 180 were replaced by the Type 235 in 1951, with an up-rated 135 engine producing 152 hp (113 kW; 154 PS).
Until the early 1950s, a continuing demand for military vehicles enabled the company to operate at reasonable albeit low volumes, primarily thanks to demand for the Type 163 trucks, sufficient to keep the business afloat.
A 1-ton capacity light truck sharing its 3.5-litre six-cylinder overhead-valve engine with the company’s luxury cars (albeit with lowered compression ratio and reduced power output) made its debut at the 1949 Paris Motor Show. During the next twelve months, this vehicle, the Type 171, spawned several brake-bodied versions, the most interesting of which were the ambulance and 9-seater familiale variant. The vehicle’s large wheels and high ground clearance suggest it was targeted at markets where many roads were largely dust and mud, and the 171 was, like the contemporary Renault Colorale which it in some respects resembled, intended for use in France’s African colonies. The vehicle also enjoyed some export success in Brazil, and by 1952 the Type 171 was being produced at the rate of approximately 30 per month.
As passenger car sales slowed further, the last new model, a 2.0-litre jeep-like vehicle known as VLRD(Véhicule Léger de Reconnaissance (Delahaye)), sometimes known as the VRD, or VLR, was released in 1951. The French army believed that this vehicle offered a number of advantages over the “traditional” American built jeep of the period. It was in 1951 that Delahaye discontinued production of the Types 175, 178 and 180. During 1953 the company shipped 1,847 VRDs as well as 537 “special” military vehicles: the number of Delahaye- or Delage-badged passenger cars registered in the same year was in that context near negligible, at 36.
Financial difficulties created by an acute shortage of wealthy car buyers intensified. Delahaye’s main competitor, Hotchkiss, managed to negotiate a licensing agreement with American Motors, and obtained sanction to manufacture its Willys MBJeep in France. The French army had learned to appreciate the simpler machine, available at a much lower price, and cancelled Delahaye’s contract for the more sophisticated VLR reconnaissance vehicle, dealing a hard blow to Delahaye. In August 1953 the company laid off more than 200 workers and salaried employees. Rumours of management discussions with Hotchkiss over some sort of coming together proved well founded. Hotchkiss were struggling with the same problems, but it was hoped that the two businesses might prove more resilient together than separately, and an agreement was signed by the two company presidents, Pierre Peigney for Delahaye and Paul Richard for Hotchkiss, on 19 March 1954. Delahaye shareholders agreed to the protocol, which amounted to a take over of Delahaye by Hotchkiss, less than three months later, on 9 June. Hotchkiss shut down Delahaye car production. By the end of 1954, for a brief period selling trucks with the Hotchkiss-Delahaye nameplate, the combined firm was itself taken over by Brandt, and by 1955, Delahaye and Hotchkiss were out of the automotive chassis business altogether, having their facilities absorbed by the giant Brandt organization with its own objectives for its captives’ assets. By 1956, the brands Delahaye, Delage, and Hotchkiss had forever disappeared.
Delahaye 178 Drophead Coupé (1949), once owned by Elton John.
References
Jump up^Hull, Peter. “Delahaye: Famous on Road and Race Track”, in Ward, Ian, executive editor. World of Automobiles (London: Orbis, 1974), Volume 5, p.521.
Borgward is an automobile manufacturer originally founded by Carl F. W. Borgward (November 10, 1890 – July 28, 1963). The original company, based in Bremen in Germany, ceased operations in the 1960s. The Borgward group produced four brands of cars: Borgward, Hansa, Goliath and Lloyd.
The marque has since been revived by Carl Borgward’s grandson, Christian Borgward, together with his partner Karlheinz L. Knöss, with assistance from Chinese investment, and unveiled the company’s first new car in over 40 years, the BX7 at the 2015 International Motor Show.
Origins of the component companies
The origins of Bremen’s most significant auto-business go back to 1905 with the establishment in nearby Varel of the “Hansa Automobilgesellschaft” and the foundation in Bremen itself of “Namag”, maker of the Lloyd car. These two businesses merged in 1914 to form the “Hansa-Lloyd-Werke A.G.”. After the war, in the troubled economic situation then confronting Germany, the business failed to prosper and by the late 1920s faced bankruptcy. For Carl Borgward, already the successful creator of the Goliath-Blitzkarren business, the misfortunes of Hansa-Lloyd presented an opportunity greatly to expand the scope of his auto business, and he took control of it.
Carl Borgward’s first “car”, the Blitzkarren
The first “automobile” Carl Borgward designed was the 1924 Blitzkarren (lightning cart), a sort of tiny three-wheeled van with 2 hp (1.5 kW), which was an enormous success in the market gap it filled. Traders with a small budget bought it for delivery. The Reichspost ordered many of them for postal service.
Hansa Lloyd
In 1929, Borgward became the director of Hansa Lloyd AG having been able to merge his “Goliath-Werke Borgward & Co.” with “Hansa-Lloyd. The small Goliath-Blitzkarren had by now evolved into the still three wheeler timber framed synthetic leather bodied 5 or 7 hp Goliath Pioneer. Borgward turned his attention to the other businesses and led the development of the Hansa Konsul. In February 1937, there came the new Hansa Borgward 2000and in 1939 the name was shortened to Borgward 2000. The 2000 model was followed by the Borgward 2300 that remained in production until 1942.
After World War II, in 1946 Carl Borgward used some of the brand names from businesses he had acquired over the years to found three separate companies: Borgward, Goliath and Lloyd. This was intended to increase the quantity of steel allocated to his business at a time of austerity and rationing. For many purposes the companies would be run as a single entity, but in a business operated by a man to whom delegation did not come naturally the proliferation of legal entities nevertheless added unhelpful layers of complexity through the 1950s and encouraged a broadening of the range which in the end proved financially unsustainable with the sales volumes achievable. In 1949 company presented the
One of the top engineers at Borgward from 1938-1952 was Dipl. Ing. Hubert M. Meingast.
Isabella and P100
Production of the Borgward Isabella began in 1954. The Isabella would become Borgward’s most popular model and remained in production for the life of the company. In 1960 the Borgward P100 was introduced, equipped with pneumatic suspension.
Sports racers
Borgward introduced a line of 1500 cc sports racers in the late 1950s, with the 16-valve engine from these becoming a successful Formula Two power unit (which was also used by some F1 privateers in 1961).
Financial problems
Although Borgward pioneered technical novelties in the German market such as air suspension and automatic transmission, the company had trouble competing in the marketplace. While larger companies like Opel and VW took advantage of economies of scale and kept their prices low to gain market share, Borgward’s cost structure was even higher than necessary for its size, as it basically operated as four tiny independent companies and never implemented such basic cost reduction strategies as joint development and parts sharing between the company’s makes. Borgward suffered quality problems as well. The
1959-61 Lloyd Arabella 5872Lloyd Arabella was technically advanced as a water-cooled boxer with front wheel drive, but plagued with problems such as water leakage and gearbox glitches. Lloyd lost money on the car even though it was more expensive than its direct competitors.
Controversial company bankruptcy
In 1961, the company was forced into liquidation by creditors. Carl Borgward died in July 1963, still insisting the company had been technically solvent. This proved to be true in the sense that after the creditors were paid in full, there was still 4.5 million Marks left over from the business.
Controversy over the bankruptcy persists
Reports of difficulties at Borgward surfaced in an article that appeared in Germany’s leading news magazine, “Der Spiegel” on 14 December 1960”. The very long, detailed, and in places repetitive Spiegel article was highlighted by means of a picture of Borgward, cigar in mouth, on the magazine’s front cover. It was strongly critical of Carl Borgward’s business approach, and included many of the arguments later advanced to explain or justify the company’s demise. The widest range of cars from any manufacturer in Germany, produced by three till recently operationally autonomous companies (Borgward, Goliath and Lloyd) was supporting a turnover of only 650 million Marks, placing the overall sales value from the combined Borgward auto businesses only in fifth position among Germany’s auto-makers. The 70-year-old Carl Borgward’s “hands-on” insistence on an increasingly manic proliferation of new and modified models featuring adventurous, but under-developed technological innovations (“[ein] fast manischen Konstruierwut“) gave rise to components which too often did not work, broke down or fell apart, resulting in massive bills for pre-delivery remediation and/or post delivery warranty work that found their way back to the company.
The December 1960 Spiegel article was not the only serious public criticism targeting Borgward at this time: suddenly stridently negative (if more succinct) comments also turned up in the influential mass-market Bild newspaper and in television reports. Critical media commentaries also appeared concerning large loans to the Borgward Group provided by the localLandesbank.
It is apparent that the business was confronting cash-flow difficulties at the end of 1960. Capital intensive businesses such as auto manufacturing use their expensive machines and tools most efficiently if they use them constantly at full capacity, but the car market in Europe in the 1950s/60s was more seasonal than today, with sales diminishing in Winter, then peaking in the early summer months: Borgward’s inventory of unsold cars at the end of 1960 was higher than usual, reflecting ambitious growth plans, most obviously in respect of the United States market The December 1960 Spiegel article speculated that of the 15,000 Borgward cars ordered by the North American dealers in 1960 (and of the 12,000 delivered to them) 6,000 might have to be taken back following a slump in North American demand. (Borgward was not the only European auto maker hit by a North American slump in demand for imported cars during 1960. In the same year two ships carrying Renault Dauphines were turned back in mid-Atlantic because the docks in New York were overcrowded with unsold Dauphines.”)
At the end of December 1960 Borgward approached the bank for a further one million Marks of credit, the loan to be backed by a guarantee from the Bremen regional government which initially the Bremen senators agreed to provide. However, following the flood of critical press comment the senators withdrew their guarantee. They now required Carl Borgward to pledge the company itself to the state in return for the guarantee. After a tense 13-hour meeting widely reported in a still hostile media, Borgward agreed to the senate’s terms on 4 February 1961, thereby averting the bankruptcy of the business.
The Bremen Senate also insisted on appointing its own nominee as chairman of the company’s supervisory board. The man they chose was Johannes Semler whom reports generally describe as a “Wirtschaftsprüfer” (public auditor), though this designation, especially once translated into English, does less than full justice to the breadth of Semler’s career. He had studied law at university and worked initially as a lawyer. The scion of a leading Hamburg political family, in 1945 he had himself been a founding member of the centre-right CSU party, and was a member of the Bundestag between 1950 and 1953. Despite his Hamburg origins, Semler was by this time based in Munich, with a network of contacts in the Bavarian establishment that probably included fellow CSU politician and the future German chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, who in 1948 had succeeded Semler in a top administrative position within the Bizone. The appointment of Johannes Semler as the representative of the Bremen senators to chair the Borgward supervisory board would, in retrospect, contribute to the controversy that followed the Borgward bankruptcy.
On 28 July 1961 Semler, as Chairman of the supervisory board joined the directors of the three companies Borgward, Goliath and Lloyd to instigate proceedings for the establishment of a “Vergleichsverfahren”, which would have provided for a court sanctioned scheme of arrangement enabling the business to continue to trade while at the same time protecting the interests of creditors. Two months later, however, in September 1961, the Borgward and Goliath businesses were declared bankrupt, followed in November by the Lloyd business. Subsequent “conspiracy theorists” have suggested that Semler, for reasons of his own, never had any intention of allowing the Borgward auto-businesses to survive.
The conspiracy theory
Carl Borgward himself would not accept that the Borgward, Goliath and Lloyd auto businesses were technically insolvent, and the fact that none of the companies’ creditors lost money supports his case. In the light of what was known at the time, and increasingly in the light of subsequent events, the argument that the business was not really insolvent at all has, if anything, gained support. Nevertheless, evaluation of the issues requires informed and careful judgement, and the opposite case can also be made, that had the company continued trading beyond 1961 there was no reasonable prospect that it would generate sufficient cash to repay existing debts within a contractually established or reasonable period nor, indeed, to repay all necessary subsequently incurred financing and other business debts. At best, Borgward by the middle of 1961 was seen by potential investors and lenders as a much riskier prospect than it had been a year earlier.
The case for a conspiracy
It has been suggested that the media onslaught launched against Borgward at the end of 1960 was part of a well orchestrated covert campaign by other German auto-makers, jealous of Borgward’s success and spotting an opportunity to eliminate a significant rival. Even now, the Spiegel article of 14 December 1960 is strangely shrill, partisan, and out of line with the dry tone that characterised most serious business reporting at the time.
Johannes Semler, appointed by the city fathers to chair the supervisory board, ostensibly, in order to guide the business towards a more secure future, appeared a strange choice for the role despite his excellent network of contacts and long experience at the interface between business and public life. The appointment appeared stranger still after his simultaneous appointment, in 1960, to the board of BMW in Munich, his more recent political power base and by now his adopted home city. BMW had lost its old manufacturing facility in 1945 when Eisenach had ended up under Soviet control and since then had itself struggled to survive financially.
In fact, the appointment of Semler to the BMW board was one of several events which, in rapid succession, marked an improvement in the fortunes of BMW. BMW had itself come close to bankruptcy in 1959, but had been rescued thanks to a massive additional investment by Herbert Quandt, who became, behind the scenes, a remarkably successful “hands-on” principal BMW shareholder. Key to the company’s future was a new saloon/sedan smaller and more sporty than a Mercedes-Benz yet larger than a Volkswagen, and more stylish than anything then to be expected from Opel or Ford. Quandt also recruited an energetic sales director for BMW called Paul G. Hahnemann who later would assert that the BMW 1500, launched at the Frankfurt Motor Show in September 1961, created an important new niche in the German car market. Hahnemann repeated his boast so often that he gained the soubriquet “Nischen-Paule” in the press. Those who contend that Semler’s role in the Borgward bankruptcy was part of a conspiracy orchestrated on behalf of BMW to bring down Borgward point out that the “niche” allegedly defined by the mid-weight BMWs from 1961 actually bore an uncanny resemblance to the niche previously occupied by the Borgward Isabella during the 1950s.
The case against a conspiracy
Cases against conspiracies are seldom as compelling as cases in support of conspiracies. Nevertheless, Carl Borgward’s management style had never been collegiate, and during several decades as a swash-buckling engineer-entrepreneur he had never shown much appetite for opinions at variance with his own. The Spiegel article that kicked off the press onslaught in December 1960 included a withering attack on Borgward for having recently laid off 2,000 people as part of a belated attempt to streamline administration and production. In a period of boom there was little doubt that the affected workers would have found job opportunities with other German automakers, but they would have needed to relocate away from Bremen, and the Spiegel’s description of Carl Borgward’s implementation of the redundancies savagely implied a singular absence of human sensitivity. One way and another, Borgward had over several decades enjoyed plenty of opportunities to create enemies, able to feed toxic stories to the media without any need for a conspiracy among rival auto-makers.
Borgward’s approach to “product planning” was remarkably profligate. In West Germany only Opel, at this time, came close to Borgward in terms of frequency of model changes and facelifts. But Opel were backed by the financial muscle and the strong management support of General Motors, the world’s largest auto-maker and at that time itself a fabulously profitable corporation. In contrast, Borgward had only a generous (but not bottomless) credit facility from the local state bank which he coupled with a personal disinclination to delegate or discuss business decisions. Opel, for all their flamboyant marketing and a domestic market share second only to that of Volkswagen, at this time offered only two models, the Rekord and the Kapitän. It is difficult to keep up with how many different models the Borgward group was supporting. In addition to various commercial vehicles, the 1961 passenger car range included theLloyd Alexander, the Lloyd Arabella, theGoliath 1100 (rebadged in 1959 as the Borgward 1100), theBorgward Isabella and the Borgward P100. The company’s reputation for serious teething troubles on new models was not simply the result of malicious press reporting. Borgward was managed by a 70 year old autocrat without an obvious succession plan. At the height of the crisis talks in 1961 Carl Borgward received (and robustly rejected) a 200 Million Mark offer for his business from Chrysler corporation. Even without his own personal BMW connections, chairman Semler might reasonably have concluded that the Borgward business as then configured had no realistic prospect of remaining solvent for more than few more months without collapsing into a yet more destructive bankruptcy from which creditors would not recover all their cash, and which could easily end up with the company becoming a third significant foreign transplant to compete on financially unequal terms with the domestically owned auto-industry.
Post mortem
The German magazine Der Spiegel published a thoughtful piece in 1966, implying that with more a little more support, and if the proprietor had been more willing to take advice from his own directors, the Borgward company could have easily overcome its financial problems of 1961. But Carl Borgward was financially naive and reluctant to accept advice: his preferred source of credit had always involved shunning the banks and simply taking extra time to pay his creditors, rejecting advice on the financing of his business from his own Finance Director. By Autumn 1960 he was holding on to unpaid creditor invoices worth more than 100 Million Marks for sheet metal and tyres alone. Given that all the company’s creditors were eventually paid in full, the liquidation decision appeared nevertheless to have been taken prematurely.
Production in Mexico
As part of the bankruptcy process, in 1963, all manufacturing equipment for the Borgward Isabella and P100 was sold to a buyer in Mexico. Production in Mexico was delayed, but was started in August 1967 by entrepreneur Gregorio Ramirez Gonzalez. Production in Mexico ceased in 1970.
On May 21, 2008, Christian Borgward, grandson of Carl F. W. Borgward, together with his partner Karlheinz L. Knöss, founded Borgward AG in Lucerne (Switzerland). In 2005 Borgward (President) and Knöss (CEO and Vice President of the Supervisory board) started the revival of Borgward. They started the development of the new Borgward automobiles with Norwegian stylist Einar J. Hareide, who had previously worked on the Mercedes-Benz E-Class, set up the organisation and engineer team and developed a car concept.
Christian Borgward owns the brand Borgward. Borgward AG is responsible for the development, production, sales and marketing of Borgward cars, ships and aircraft.
Borgward has announced plans for a new car at the 2015 Geneva Motor Show after a 54-year hiatus. The new company will be backed up financially by Chinese truck manufacturer Foton.
The Borgward BX7SUV was introduced at the IAA, Frankfurt in September 2015.
A concept version of a second, smaller SUV, to be named BX5 when in production is to be announced at the 2016 Geneva Salon.
That was all I could find about Borgward, Goliath, Hansa, Lloyd. There is more about DKW, Horch, Audi, EMW, Glass, Goggomobil, Tempo and other marks with somethimes the same look. Look at publications on myntransportblog.com further. See you all later. Enjoy.
FNM logo, largely inspired by the Alfa Romeo logo.
Fábrica Nacional de Motores (FNM) was a Brazilian manufacturer of engines and motor vehicles based in the Xerém district of Duque de Caxias near Rio de Janeiro that operated between 1942 and 1988.
Origins
The company was created 1942 by the Brazilian state as part of the Estado Novo agenda of President Getúlio Dornelles Vargas. It was one of several business launched by the state during this period (including also Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional launched in 1941 and CHESF in the later 1940s) to kick start an industrial sector in Brazil. Initially the company produced American Curtiss-Wright aircraft engines under license along with ammunition, bicycles, spindles and refrigerators.
FNM D-11.000 with Brasinca cabin, 1961
After the Second World War it was decided to diversify production. The government was keen to launch a vehicle manufacturing industry. In 1949 an agreement was reached with the Italian manufacturer, Isotta Fraschini, whereby FNM would produce the Milanese company’s heavy trucks under license. Isotta Fraschini commercial vehicles enjoyed an excellent reputation at this time, but the Italian company was already economically troubled, although its formal bankruptcy would be put off till the end of 1951.
The Alfa Romeo connection
FNM D-11.000 truck, 1964
The disappearance of Isotta Fraschini as a vehicle manufacturer left FNM looking for a new technology partner. In 1952 an agreement was signed with Alfa Romeo, another Milanese vehicle manufacturer. Unusually in Europe, Alfa Romeo was (like FNM) a state owned business, following bankruptcy and a government rescue in the 1930s. Under the agreement with Alfa Romeo, FNM would manufacture Alfa Romeo’s commercial vehicle range under license. Though little known north of the Alps, Alfa Romeo commercial vehicles were well established in Italy, and other south European markets. Between 1956 and 1960 FNM built more than 15,000 heavy trucks of Alfa Romeo design: it also manufactured the chassis for buses and coaches. In the Brazilian heavy truck sector which FNM dominated till the early 1970s, FNM was initially the only manufacturer. Trucks produced by FNM were generally nicknamed “Fenemê”.
1968 FNM JK 2000
In the mid-fifties a company called Fabral S.A. (Fábrica Brasileira de Automóveis Alfa, “the Brazilian Alfa automobile factory”), a collaboration between Alfa Romeo and Brazilian investor Matarazzo, was set up to build the Alfa Romeo 2000 (tipo 102/B, “B” for Brazil). The car was to be built in Jacareí, in the state of São Paulo. The Matarazzo Group backed out in 1958, following troubled discussions about the suitability of building luxurious cars in poor Brazil. After pressure from then-President Juscelino Kubitschek FNM, in which Alfa Romeo already held a minority interest, took over the project. In 1960 FNM’s first passenger car was launched, the FNM 2000, a Brazilian version of the series 102 Alfa Romeo 2000 four-door sedan (berlina). The factory ended up being built in the Xerém neighborhood, of Duque de Caxias, Rio de Janeiro instead. The engine was the same 1,975 cc twin camshaft unit found in the Italian product, but detuned to produce only 95 PS (70 kW) and the car received the FNM logo. This series of cars was named “J.K.” in honor of President Kubitschek who had helped make the deal take place. This was by far the most luxurious, and most expensive, car built in Brazil in the period.
Brazilian made FNM Onça, made by Genaro “Rino” Malzoni in 1966, over an Alfa Romeo platform
A coupé version was offered from 1966. Known as the FNM Onça (“Jaguar”), the coupé did not follow the line of any Alfa Romeo design, but featured an elegant locally designed body unmistakably reminiscent of the original Ford Mustang. The regular FNM 2000, meanwhile, was followed by more powerful versions, culminating with the 130 PS (96 kW) TIMB (“Turismo Internazional Modelo Brasileiro”), now boasting usefully more power than was claimed for its Alfa Romeo cousins of the time. The TIMB also featured a flat bonnet with a lower-mounted grille, as suggested by Lincoln Tendler aiming a better aerodynamic penetration, and a divided front bumper to accommodate the lower centerpiece. This same front design was also used for the succeeding FNM 2150, with some detail differences.
Alfa Romeo control
1971 Brazilian made FNM Furia GT, made by Toni Bianco in 1971, over an Alfa Romeo platform
In 1968 Alfa Romeo acquired a controlling share in the hitherto state-owned FNM business. The next year the FNM 2000 was replaced by a restyled version, the FNM 2150, the most obvious visual differences affecting the front of the car. For this application the twin camshaft four cylinder engine saw its capacity increased to 2132 cc, and performance was further enhanced through the installation of a better set of carburetors. The five-speed gearbox was the same one used in all cars made up to that moment. The FNM 2150 would continue in production from 1969 till 1974.
In 1971, another coupé called the Furia GT 2150 was presented to the public. Based on chassis and mechanics of the FNM/JK 2150 cc model, the car was designed by Brazilian designer Toni Bianco. Only a few hand built examples were produced, but the stylish coupé may have helped the public image of the by now aging design of the mainstream FNM 2150. Bianco later made some sporting creations carrying his own name.
Alfa Romeo had disposed of its commercial vehicle operations in Italy in the 1960s, and in 1973 the FNM commercial vehicle business was sold to Fiat‘s industrial vehicle division, while Alfa Romeo retained responsibility for the FNM automobile business – subsequently FNM’s commercial vehicle business ended up being absorbed into Fiat’s Brazilian Iveco business.
The 1954 FNM 210 clearly shows its Alfa Romeo origins in design.
Closing chapter
1974 saw the FNM 2150 replaced with the Alfa Romeo 2300. This was the end for the FNM badged cars: the FNM badge itself, obviously inspired by the Alfa Romeo badge, was also replaced on this car with an actual Alfa Romeo badge. The general look of the new car was very similar to that of the Italian built Alfetta sedan, designed by Giuseppe Scarnati and first offered in Europe in 1972, although the Brazilian car was actually 41 centimetres (16 in) longer and 7 centimetres (2.8 in) wider than the Alfetta. Under the skin, the 2300 was based technically on the older Alfa Romeo 1900. The gear box of the 2300 was conventionally located adjacent to the engine and not (as with the Alfetta) across the rear axle. Like its Brazilian predecessor the 2300 featured a four-cylinder twin-camshaft engine, now of 2310 cc with a claimed output of 140 hp (100 kW). A maximum speed of 170 km/h (106 mph) was claimed. For the 1985 model year the 2300 was renamed as “Alfa Romeo 85”. This model was manufactured until November 1986.
Marketing opportunities were identified in Europe where Alfa Romeo’s locally designed attempt to move upmarket had made little impact on the competitionfrom Bavaria: the Brazilian Alfa Romeo was offered briefly in 1981 under the designation Alfa Rio and distributed by Alfa Romeo Germany. Additionally, around 600 of the cars were shipped to The Netherlands.
The end
Alfa Romeo faced difficulties in Europe during the late 1970s and early 1980s, coming under increasing commercial pressure from the threelargestGerman up-market auto producers even in Italy. Objective financial data concerning nationalized businesses are seldom published, but Alfa Romeo is believed to have operated at a substantial loss for much of its time under state control: in 1986 Romano Prodi who was at the time chairman of the IRI (the government body responsible for nationalised industries in Italy), wishing to reduce the losses of the IRI, transferred Alfa Romeo to the private sector, which in Italy’s mass market automobile business meant at this time Fiat. Since 1976 Fiat had been developing its own Brazilian operation, based in Betim. The Brazilian-based car business that had formerly comprised FNM was accordingly integrated into Fiat’s own Brazilian operation, and in 1988 the FNM badged commercial vehicles – already produced by a Fiat owned business since Alfa Romeo sold the business in 1973 – were rebadged as Iveco products.
Automobile production volumes
Production volumes of the FNM 2000/2150, to the extent these can be determined: